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The Application of the Criteria
of the Just War Theories
in the Resolution of
Medical-Ethical Dilemmas
at the Bedside
by
Ms. Anne B. Baker

This paper was originally written for a class taken with J Bryan Hehir on The
Just War Theories, at Harvard Divinity School, Spring semester, 1993.
In an age of technology gone awry there is a desperate need for moral,
philosophical, and ethical reasoning to play "catch-up" in the arena of practical
application. This was a problem in 1945 at the dawn of the Nuclear Age and is a
problem now in the early childhood years of the medical technological age.
Here, we propose to address the need for a means to make basic ethical
decisions as a part of routine medical care. Applied ethics seeks not only to
answer the question "what is the just 1 thing to do?" It also directs its effort toward
making choices in actual cases. We will introduce a process for decision-making
which provides the tools for the practitioner and the patient to use veryday, in
every circumstance. The process has to be able to stand the tests of
universibilizability, that is it must be useful in all areas of medicine and
generalizability, that is it must be applicable to all like situations by all people in
the same way. Which ever method of ethical reasoning is used, for instance in an
emergency room in Boston must also be usable in a neonatal ward in Houston.
The usefulness of the method of ethical reasoning must work regardless of the
people, places, or circumstances involved.
In the United States the method must also find acceptance in a pluralistic
society. It must be open to all philosophical and religious calculation. We can not
impose a singular view on people who would find it repugnant or morally
reprehensible. At the same time we must provide a framework in which we ask,
"What is the just thing to do?" "The moral challenge of pluralism is the search for
a consensus broad enough to provide moral coherence, but narrow enough to
protect religious liberty."2 There should be no forseen exclusion of people from
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any religious or ethnic group in the application of this method of ethical
reasoning. For instance, the pacifists of politics would be consistent with the
Christian Scientists of medicine.
The purpose of this article is to introduce a formulaic process, framework,
algorithm if you will, for making ethical decisions in actual medical cases. The
formula has a 1500 year tradition. It has demonstrated a comprehensive
inclusion of the ethical considerations presented by the dilemmas at hand. It has
also been adaptable enough to stand the tests of time and place. Evidence for the
proclivity for comprehensive, adaptable tools for decision-making and
subsequent action in medical practice, can be seen in the widespread use of the
Glasgow Coma Score in head injury, the Apgar Score for the immediate
evaluation of newborns, the ABCs of the basic rescue, and the American Heart
Association's algorithms for advanced cardiac life support, to name a few. These
allow health care providers to be on common ground with common standards in
the field, clinic, or hospital whether they are in Boston or Los Angeles.
At this time, there appears to be no standardization of ethical reasoning
routinely used in medicine. Many decisions are made using the processes
physicians learned during internships and residences. In spite of their good
intentions, these were not taught by people who were trained primarily in
pbilosophy or ethics. There is an increasing need for a straightforward method for
bioethical decision-making. This requires no graphs, no charts, no conversion
equations. In a phrase, we need "adaptable simplicity." Terribly complex
solutions can't be applied in urgent situations.
One of the pitfalls of the non-standardized method of good intention, is the
problem of making medical judgments based on moral sentiment and not on a
fixed formulaic process of comprehensive questioning, such as we present here.
"As ethicists, we must, in tum, give the highest priority to careful reconsideration
of the limits and functions of various modes of moral discourse in different
contexts, lest we be left to the capricious whim or definition of ,right' as the will of
the strongest."3
In this article we will demonstrate the use of the criteria of the just-war
theories, primarily as defined by James Childress.4 In his work, Childress bases
the historical granting of permission to take up arms, on the conflict between the
prima facie duty5 to do no harm, and the duties to restore peace and to protect the
innocent which override it. 6
It cannot be stressed too often or too strongly that the criteria must be used as a
group. Not to consider them as a unit would be tantamount to starting an LV. and
not connecting anything to it, or taking an X-ray without using film, or
performing surgery and not closing the incision. There are many things in
medicine which must be done completely. This is one of them!
It may at first seem incongruous to even consider the use of the criteria of the
just-war theories to make treatment or care decisions in medicine. However, a
close look at the development and purpose of these criteria will provide a
plausible connection to modem medicine.
In modern medicine we start with the prima facie duty to do no harm. As we
move from that duty as an idea to the duty as a bedside practice, we equip
4
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ourselves with the stuff of modern medicine. Our modalities of treatment include:
testing, such as "lab work" and imaging; treatment with drugs, therapies and
surgical intervention; nursing care with human and technical monitoring; and the
advanced technologies of modernity: dialysis, artificial ventilation, anesthesia,
and feeding tubes, among others.
As we glance through this familiar list we see two things. First, as in war, they
all do harm. Harm in the form of pain, restriction, invasion and exposure. We
need to remember this. To stick people with needles to obtain blood samples or
or to administer therapy hurts! To take an X-ray is to expose the patient to
potentially deadly radiation. To make a proper diagnosis or to monitor patients,
we frequently obtain information that people would prefer no one know about
them, and yet we invade privacy.
Secondly, in both war and medicine we must seek an exemption to our duty to
do no harm. For deciding if we can be granted an exemption to the prima facie
duty to do no harm the criteria of the just-war theories are very helpful. The use of
these criteria do not necessarily lead to just one conclusion for a specific treatment
plan. Think for a moment of the good people found on both sides of the Gulf War
debate or the invasion of Bosnia debate. For this reason, the agent or agents
seeking an exemption from doing no harm must strive to develop as virtuous
agent in order to reach the most satisfactory decisions possible.
When the Hippocratic Oath was penned it could not have been imagined that
serious debate about over-treating would arise and continue for decades. In the
United States today health care providers constantly face the task of making
decisions about what constitutes the ethical treatment of people entrusted to their
care. Never before in medical history have so many been so confused by a myriad
of choices set before them by the creators of medical technology.
Every day, every minute, choices for drug therapy alone represent thousands
of hours of decision-making effort As the complexity of patients' medical
problems rise, the options for tech"ological interventions rise exponentially.
Considering the ethics of the means we use for care, no longer is the simple
question of yesterday, i.e. ordinary v. extraordinary means, entirely adequate to
resolve bioethical dilemmas. We now must ask: "Which of the extraordinary
choices set before me, as a health care provider, should I or may I offer as
treatment to the patient at hand?" The questions posed by old means of treatment
are complicated by questions of autonomy, cost, futility, experimental treatments
and the rapid introduction of new technologies.
The Childress model of the just-war theories uses eight criteria. They are:
legitimate authority, just cause, reasonable hope for success, just intention, due
proportion, just means, declaration, and last resort.1 Arthur Dyck considers these
criteria to demonstrate ethical decision-making in the decision to perform an
appendectomy. The purpose of, or cause for, the surgery is to prevent the death of
the patient. The intention is the well-being of the patient. The operation must be
performed on the one who has appendicitis, accurately diagnosed as such. The
risk of death from untreated appendicitis is very high. The risk from surgery is
small; the chance of success is very high. There is no alternative treatment, given
the condition of the appendix of the patient and given existing knowledge.
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Informed written consent is obtained within a hospital setting. The operation is
performed by a credentialled doctor, experienced as a surgeon, or supervised by
one who is.8
In this article we will formalize and expand the process. We will set forth an
alogrithm of eight criteria. All eight criteria must be considered to make the
formulaic process viable. In our opinion, all the areas of concern in bioethical
decision-making are given consideration. This process differs from other ways to
make ethical decisions because it is comprehensive, rather than focusing on just
one criterion such as: the benefit/burden proportion, rules, consequences,
emotional sentiment or utility as the only consideration.
We recognize that no idea is complete when first thought. We wish to solicit
comments and constructive criticism from our colleagues in both medicine and
ethics. This will surely lead to improvements not only in the use of this method
but, more importantly, it will benefit the patient to whom we dedicate our lives of
service and care. Finally, it is our hope that this method of reasoning will be one
of the methods used as we move ethical theory into ethical practice.
Now we will discuss the criteria. We will present the historical context first and
then demonstrate the appropriate application in bioethics. Finally we will present
an actual case in which this formulaic process was used.
Legitimate Authority

Who decides?
The purpose of this first criterion is to identify what party or parties are
primarily responsible for making the decision to move forward. It is this party
who is "primarily responsible for judging whether the other criteria are met."9
Determining right or legitimate authority in civil or political matters, varies with
the type of government in power. In general a government which can: maintain
order within its state and protect its borders is a legitimate government. In a
democracy a very important addition is that the consent of the governed is
necessary to legitimate government action and power because "the citizen is ruler
as well as subject." 10 In the United States the duly elected Congress represents the
will of the people to work in conjunction with the President in the decision to
take up arms and go to war.
The legitimate authority not only decides whether or not to intervene but also
how to have the combatants conduct themselves during war. During the conflict
the individual has a moral right (although not a legal right) not to participate in
activities he or she finds morally unjust. lI
The legitimate authority in medicine is analogous to the model of the
legitimate authority in government. The physician and the patient constitute the
legitimate authority in medicine as the duly elected officials and the electorate
constitute the legitimate in politics. There are few exceptions to the rule of the
patient as autonomous in medicine.12 Physicians are vested with legitimate
authority for a number of reasons. They have been educated in credentialled
schools of medicine; had supervised medical experience; received licensure from
their government; practice in credentialled facilities; have been accredited and
credentialled, in their area of expertise, by various professional medical boards;
6
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and assent to the ancient, sacred physician/patient covenant. Some physicians
have been burdened by the full weight of decision-making for some of their
patients. Although the physician is the leader of the health care team and has
considerable authority for making the diagnosis and for developing the treatment
plan, the patient must also take part in the decision-making process. The patient's
ability to make an informed decision about which therapeutic course to freely
elect to follow, depends greatly on the skill of the physician and the health care
team to present accurate diagnoses and treatment options.
Since the dilemma of the case of Karen Ann Quinlan l3 the government has
become increasingly involved in the issue of legitimate authority in medical
decision-making. Rare is the week during which there is no report in the secular
press of bioethical decision-making reaching the courts. Interestingly, in 1957
Pius XII stated "The rights and duties of the doctor are correlative to those of the
patient. The doctor, in fact, has no separate or independent right where the
patient is concerned. In general he (sic) can take action only if the patient
explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, gives him (sic) permission."14
However, because the legitimate authority of the physician is correlative to that
of the patient, the authority of the physician is strictly bound to his or her own
conscience. As a result, if the physician finds the health care wishes or plans of the
patient to be medically and/or morally untenable or outside the scope of his or
her expertise or the expertise ofthe facility, the physician may find it necessary to
transfer the patient to another service and/ or facility. Concomitantly, the patient
has this same right.
With the enactment of the Health Care Proxy Law in 1990, the weight of
decision-making responsibility has expanded from the patient, when able to
speak competently, to the inclusion of proxy declarations of the patient's wishes
when incompetence is established.IS Several legal cases in Massachusetts have
been precedent-setting in the area of patient autonomy. Their implications for
legitimate authority are useful to remember. The adult patient (and emancipated
minor) has the right to refuse medical intervention l6 if he or she is competent,
which is presumed l7 unless proven otherwise and it is considered assault l8 to treat
him or her without proper informed consent. This is based on the right to privacy
against interference with bodily integrity.19 Exercise oflegitimate authority and
its expressed need for not only a credentialled and competent care provider, but
also for informed consent, is not necessarily an easy task.
The patient in medicine, as the congress and the people in politics, have the
obligation to actively engage in the process of informed consent in the face of
intervention. It is the duty of the credentialled and experienced physician to make
an accurate diagnosis, develop a reasonable care plan and to find the language
which will be adequate to allow the patient to make a reasonable decision about
care. Informed consent does not necessarily happen all at once. It should start
during routine care when the caregiver and the patient engage in conversation
about the patient's goals and values for living. The patient cannot be left to his or
her own devices in highly stressed situations to sort out dilemmas. Autonomy
does not leave the patient in a vacuum.20
Once the legitimate authority criterion is met it will be an ongoing factor in
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. the decision-making process. It may even occur that the patient and the
practitioner need to separate because of irreconcilable differences in the care
plan.
Just Cause

For what reason do we seek to intervene? Is it just?
In the political arena we may seek an exemption to the prima/ade duty to do
no harm and to take up arms "if a serious and weighty reason exists"21 to do so.
There are classic reasons. First, to protect the innocent from unjust attack by
using the least amount of force necessary to stop the aggressor. Second, to restore
rights wrongfully denied. Finally, to re-establish just order. 22
Just cause for medical intervention can follow the same thinking as that in
war. Understanding it is important for several reasons. In the model for care in
Western medicine the Hippocratic Oath states, "I will follow that system of
regime which, according to my ability and judgments, I consider for the benefit
of my patient." Secondly, the first tenet of medicine Primum non nocere (first do
no harm) alerts us to the need to examine, the reason(s) for which we seek to
intervene in the life of another. We need a just reason. Also, competing with
claims of good health and well-being, a disruptive interference with bodily
integrity must be serious and weighty.
Based on this assumption, we must examine what constitutes ajust cause for
doing harm to a patient. Let us remember at this point that unintentional harm is,
in fact, being done when we: stick people with needles to obtain samples for
examination or to administer therapy. Harm is being done when we expose
people to radiation for diagnostic or therapeutic reasons. Harm is being done
when we save lives with cardiopulmonary resuscitation, surgery and give
medications, among other things.
We must remember that the weight of the claim of the patient to be treated
and cared for needs to be considered in the light of the cause for intervention.
Therefore we must refrain from intervening unless we can satisfy the claim that
we seek to help the patient to live in such a way that his or her values and
integrity are protected. To do this it is reasonable to defend the patient against
their own body parts which threaten life and well-being through unjust
aggression of agents such as pathogens; failed organs; pain too terrible to bear;
injury or mental anguish. Further, we can recover something wrongfully taken,
such as the patient's good health. We can eliminate evil, as in removing a tumor,
to prevent future or further damage to the patient. These are just causes for
inflicting the least amount of unintentional harm in the form of medical
treatment in the care of another person.
In this criterion we are asking only if there is just cause to harm people, even
slightly, in our effort to help them maintain well-being or restore good health.
We ask, what is the reason to intervene for this patient, at this time, under these
circumstances? Is it just?

8
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Probability For Success

What will be the predictable outcome? Is it reasonable to assume that we will
achieve ajust peace if we take up arms? This criterion is based on the reasonable
(not absolute) hope for achieving peace through the taking upof arms in war. It is
derived from the prohibition against suicide. 23 We also need to be aware of the
deleterious effects of war on the spirit ofthe people and the possibility of having a
military success at the cost of a national disaster. 24 The American Bishops are
succinct about the purpose of this criterion "to prevent irrational resort to force
or hopeless resistance when the outcome will clearly be disproportionate or
futile."25 Here is the clear point at which we apply this criterion to the practice of
medicine.
Reasonable hope for success is established through the just cause and the right
intention, using just means and being based on the telos of the patient and
reasonable medical standards. In light of this, there are four questions to consider
as we proceed. First, can we/must we use every available technology, on every
patient, without consideration of the possibility of the end point of this treatment
to be futile?26
Second, is there a likelihood that the patient will be returned to a reasonable
state of well-being? Third, what are the qualities oflife that the patient is enjoying
before the intervention? Are they what the patient finds to be acceptable?
Finally, how does the patient define success?
As far as the use of technology is concerned, we are on the horns of a dilemma.
However, defining our purpose in the just cause criterion, will help determine
which, if any, technology we will consider using. A problem arises from the
public demand for a cure for everything. We see it in the demand for the use and
misuse of technology on the one hand and the fear people have of being enslaved
to technology on the other. There is great need for extensive public discourse on
the meaning of success vis a vis global medical outcomes.
One of our most visible dilemmas in the use of the success criterion is the Do
Not Resuscitate Order (DNR). Looking at the rationale for the DNR is helpful
in making determinations for other interventions. Resuscitation should not be
initiated if there is no demonstrated benefit to the patient; if there will be a poor
quality of life after resuscitation, in the patient's opinion (for instance it would
leave the patient permanently unconscious and he or she finds that
unacceptable); there is a poor quality of life, in the patient's opinion, before the
attempted resuscitation, (for instance if the patient is in end-stage organ failure or
cancer).27
Although the DNR is written by the physician, it prescinds from the legitimate
authority discussed above. The order signifies that the patient has refused a
procedure. 28 Of course in the case of real uncertainty, good medicine errs on the
side of life. If it is found that a patient has been resuscitated who did not want to
be, treatment can be withdrawn with the same legal, ethical and moral certainty
as it can be forgone.
.
Consider here that futility is dependent on the intended end of our treatment
and on the telos of the patient. For these reasons futility is sometimes an illusive
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notion. We need to discuss the futility of care with patients as part of an
evolutionary care plan. A good clinical description offutile care is that it will fail
in clinical terms or that it will work but won't postpone death for even a few
minutes. 29
Success, futility and qualities of life are all considered first in light of the
patient's most deeply held proclivities and inhibitions. As we stated earlier, the
rights of the physician and the health care team are correlative to those of the
patient. The inclinations of the health care providers, family and community
should be considered in decision making along with those of the patient and the
physician. However the physician, as the team leader and medical expert and the
patient, as a moral agent are the most important decision makers.
Just Intention

What do I reasonably hope to achieve by this intervention? Why am I doing
this? Is it in keeping with good medical practice and the telos of the patient? Do I
seek first to do no harm?
Just intention is to achieve the just cause or goal by using just means. The just
cause in war is peace. Childress considers the just intention of both the decision to
take up arms and of the conduct of those who justly bear arms. Thejust intention
of and in war focuses on the just cause of peace as the object, end or telos ofwar. 30
It is in the consideration of just intention that we examine the motive for our
actions. If we seek good health and life as a particular, precious member of a
sacred group, must we or can we sometimes do some harm to achieve an equal or
greater good? The right intention also means "avoiding unnecessarily destructive
acts or imposing unreasonable conditions" during the course of war. 3l
Our intent in medicine is first to do no harm and second to restore the patient
to the best health and well-being that he or she can reasonably expect. This
includes helping the patient to live as fully as possible in community. Our
intention can not stand alone in the process of moral evaluation. Right intention,
just means, and due proportion are inextricably linked in the ethic we are
describing. What we say we intend must be verifiable by the means we use and by
the proportion of foreseeable harm done to the good achieved. It is very difficult
to ascertain the interiority of the intent of others and sometimes even ourselves.
Nevertheless, the outcome of the action is verifiable and must be considered and
accounted for in order for right or just intention to be met. Therefore we ask: "Do
the means I have chosen verify the intent I have stated for this choice of
treatment?"
Problems can arise when we are routinely confronted with ways to help
patients that are harmful in some measure. They may be painful, costly,
inconvenient or burdensome for the patient. We need to take care not to employ
means that are unnecessarily destructive or impose unreasonable demands on the
patient in his or her opinion. Frequently, the principal of double effect has been
employed in the consideration of the intent of medical intervention. 32
10
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Due Proportion
What is the balance between the true, overall harm done and the good
reasonably hoped for? Is the anticipated good equal to or greater than the
expected harm?
When taking up arms, due proportion is considered in the granting of an
exception to the prima facie duty to do no harm. Balancing the good and evil
effects in war is uncertain because the total infliction of harm must be considered
and this is of course very difficult. 33 In war the cost of lives of troops and
noncombatants, from all causes as well as the financial drain and destruction of
resources needs to be accounted for and balanced before intervening. The
probable good is balanced with the foreseeable harm in both the political and
medical application of this criterion.
Again, we consider the need to inflict some harm with sharp objects,
medications, and invasion of privacy, among others. In considering proportion
we can not be frozen in inaction, rather we assess the benefit/burden ratio. An
example of the need to consider benefit/burden ratios can readily be seen in
therapy requiring punctures. Have we escalated a therapy's burden with multiple
sticks when an indwelling catheter might be placed early in the intervention?
One is not required to use extraordinary means to save one's life. These means
have been referred to as disproportionate means in recent years. The
benefit/ burden ratio is considered first from the patient's perspective. The
questions explored are: is the intervention too painful, too costly, too
inconvenient or too great a burden in light of the expected outcome? The
physician has two responsibilities here. First to advocate for the patient and
second to consider the true, overall cost of this intervention. We ask, "Is this
treatment the right fit for this patient, at this time"?
"There is no such thing as free care. Somebody always ends up paying for it."34
This is a reminder of the financial cost of treatment which, more and more is
considered in the proportionality of benefit to burden. We are frequently
challenged by the allocation of scarce resources. In this area the balance is
between the needs of this patient as a member of the community as a whole.
However, the allocation of scarce resources can not be confused with rationing or
intentional shorting of medical goods and services to the significant detriment of
the patients.
What is the true, overall cost of our intervention? Will we do more harm than
good when we intervene in a particular way?
Just Means

Is the intervention which I propose, going to give each his or her due? The act
can be either an act or omission. 35 Is the act or omission a good or indifferent act?
Not to act is, of course, active medical intervention.
To grant an exception to the duty not to harm, the means used in the conduct
of war is considered. This includes not only a limit to the kinds of weapons used
but also places limits on the conduct of the combatants in conflict. That is,
noncombatants must be protected and no more force than is necessary to stop
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unjust aggression and restore a just peace may be employed. Further,just means
requires good faith, respect for the humanity of the enemy, and an immediate
object not to kill. 36 The conduct of war today is especially important because of
the overwhelming devastating potential of the weapons available to some
nations.
We can not go beyond the immediate goal of obtaining a just peace by using
means with the intent merely to destroy. Just as obliteration bombing was
condemned37 because the means employed, the intentional slaughter of the
innocent, was unjust and out of proportion to the intent: to demoralize the spirit
of a nation, so too, must we examine the use of modem technology, such as
nuclear weapons and the purpose of their use in war.
When we examine the means we must be sure that they involve good or
indifferent acts or methods and that the intent which must also be good can verify
the means which we use. In medicine we focus on the intent to restore good
health and well-being while minimizing the harm done. Therefore, interventions
must not create a new victim. That means, that 1) one intervenes on the basis of a
legitimate, diagnosed need and 2) the patient makes an informed voluntary
decision. These points are critical and parallel "never deliberately targeting a
noncombatant", i.e. never targeting an "innocent" or unarmed person.
There is no requirement to use every means available especially if they
represent too great a burden to the patient. We often ask, "Just because we can do
it, must we do it?" The answer is, no. We need to know if the intervention fits the
need of this patient in these circumstances. Proportionality is considered under its
own criterion, in order to determine if the means are in proportion to the good
they can do.
We must first seek to do no harm. This includes the overtreatment as well as
the undertreatment of our patients. Will the means we propose help this patient
to realize his or her telos?38 In a practical sense, we need to have the patient
consider what values and meaning they find in life. If life to one patient is
primarily physiological and metabolic, the just means considered would differ
from those means considered by one who places emphasis on life lived in
community. We will listen to the patient who is telling us, as well as possible,
what means will be appropriate. This formulaic process will accomodate a wide
variety of predilections on the part of the physician and the patient.
In medicine we ask the following questions. Is the means good in itself? Is it too
painful, costly, inconvenient or unlikely to succeed? Does it create an innocent
victim of either the caregiver or the patient? Does the means fit the medical need
to maximize the patient's health and well-being? Finally, and very importantly,
does the means used verify the stated, just intention of the intervention?

Declaration
Have we discussed and made public our intention to intervene?
This is the final stage before intervention. It is the responsibility of the parties
seeking an exemption to the duty to do no harm to explain themselves. 39 There
are limits as well as requirements to this criterion. The truthful declaration of war
must be stated while the details of the battle plan remain secret. In a democracy,
12
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the declaration allows the governed to consent or to refuse to go to war. It allows
for public discourse and for retreat to less violent means.
The same prescription for disclosure and confidentiality hold true in medicine.
The patient must supply informed consent. The importance for the criterion in
medicine is that it allows for moral disclosure among the health care team, the
patient, the family, and the community. Further, it allows for retreat to less drastic
means or the foregoing of extraordinary means. Several things are considered at
this time: informed consent, the right to privacy, public disclosure, and
professional consultation.
Informed consent has been discussed under legitimate authority. It overlaps
here because it is in this criterion that the patient, having been reasonably well
informed, either consents to the care plan or chooses a less drastic course of
action. Informed consent is necessary because the patient, as a moral agent, must
understand the benefit/burden ratio of the proposed care plan before consenting
to the risks and anticipated harm to be inflicted.
It is the duty of the one seeking to intervene, that is the health care provider,
generally the physician, to explain and justify the care plan, and the patient to
accept it. This is analogous to the responsibility described in political
intervention. The health care provider is responsible to find the language which
the patient can understand and which is not overly prejudicial in nature.
Disclosure of sufficient information is necessary to allow the patient to reach a
reasonable decision. 40 This does not require the disclosure of all risks if the
physician believes the patient already has some information41 , nor does it call for
the disclosure of information which the patient could not reasonably understand.
Truth in disclosure in medicine is crucial to the exemption to the duty to do no
harm. It is an opportunity for the patient and the caregiver to grow in mutual trust
and cooperation. Although it is sometimes difficult, failure to obtain informed
consent is a failure to exercise the doctor/patient trust in good faith. This consent
must be in writing, on the record in order to substantiate intent and to allow the
opportunity to check for mistakes, at a later time.
Patient confidentiality has been a concern since the time of Hippocrates.
"What I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of treatment in
regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will
keep to myself."42 The right to privacy is not absolute. It is generally accepted that
patient privacy ends where public peril begins. That is why we report gunshot
wounds, some stabbings and some communicable diseases. The Tarasoff
Decision establishes the need for disclosure by the physician when an identifiable
victim exists. However, the preponderence of cases will require routine
announcement of the care plan to the patient, discussion of the care plan and
options, the gathering of any necessary consults, and informed consent.
In sum, the declaration criterion asks the questions: have I informed the patient
reasonably well about his or her condition, choices of therapy, and gotten
permission to treat in accordance with good medical practice and the patient's
wishes? Have I maintained confidentiality and protected the public from peril;
have I engaged in public discourse; have I gotten any necessary consults; do I
have the patient's consent form signed and placed in the record for current and
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future accuracy of the intent ofthe patient; and have I retreated to less invasive or
disruptive means if indicated?
The Last Resort

Have I provided an evolutionary care plan? Have I tried less violent means first
and failed to meet the just goal with them?
In politics of war, it is the purpose of this criterion to retain the primajacie duty
to do no harm. It starts with the efforts to avoid war. The last resort recognizes
that it is not necessary that "all possible measures have been attempted and
exhausted if there is no reasonable expectation that they will be successful. "43 For
instance, if blockades and negotiations have failed after a reasonable effort has
been made, there is no need to have false hope for them to restore just order and
provide peace.
The same holds true in medicine. Least drastic means (starting with
prevention) are tried first in an evolutionary care plan. In developing a care plan
we consider several things from the perspective of both ethics and good standards
of medicine: have we determined the goal oftreatment with this patient; does the
patient know that he or she can forego or withdraw a specific treatment if it seems
or becomes too burdensome; have we used technology properly; and is this an
evolutionary care plan?
These considerations are all part of routine, evolutionary care plans which
include understanding by the patient when cures are easily effected and when
treatment plans need repeated modification and change. They require the
acknowledgment that at some point the patient will die. An evolutionary plan
faces both the tremendous good that medicine can accomplish and the power of
nature over our best efforts in the end. Arthur Dyck discusses the need for ideal
companionship in Rights and Responsibilities. 44 This should be the end, in good
medical care when we can no longer hope for a cure.
Technology presents a double edged sword in many ways. It has, at once, the
potential for great good and for great harm. For instance, imaging techniques can
confirm diagnoses but cumulative radiation can cause great harm. The jury is still
out on the long term affects of multiple ultrasounds and magnetic resonance
imagings. Cardiac catheterizations are much less invasive than surgery but more
so than imaging. The point is that aggressive treatment may be necessary to save
life but the least risky procedures should be considered before resorting to the
more or the most risky intervention. Waiting for test results, such as HIV testing,
and paying for some extraordinary treatments, such as transplantations or
monoclonal antibodies, may pose a morally unacceptable burden for the patient.
In areas where there are teaching hospitals and large tertiary facilities we tend to
forget that some people find it too burdensome to leave their support networks to
avail themselves of the most sophisticated medical treatment. We need to know
what the patient's hopes and fears are in order to develop a care plan which
minimizes burdens while maximizing realistic hope and well-being. Here we
review previous and future treatment with the patient to insure that the least
amount of harm will be inflicted, while insuring that we will be a faithful
companion throughout. Ongoing treatments are evaluated for efficacy,
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tolerability, and for futility; then necessary modifications can be made.
Conclusion

The use of the criteria of the just-war theories provides a comprehensive,
simple, formulaic process and algorithm for making sound bioethical decisions at
the bedside.
We have demonstrated that the ethical concerns of non-maleficence,
autonomy, disclosure, confidentiality, beneficence, justice and good medicine
can be considered using the same criteria in the field, the office or in the hospital.
We will remember that we need to exempt ourselves from the prima facie duty
to do no harm each time we harm or allow harm to be done to ourselves or to
another. In medicine we frequently need to do some harm in order to achieve a
greater or equal good. We ask eight questions and need favorable responses to
proceed. The questions are easily incorporated into routine decision-making.
First: Just Cause. Do I have a just or worthy reason for this action? Second:
Legitimate Authority. Do I have legitimate authority? Have I asked the patient
and am I qualified, in a qualified setting, to do the task? Third: Probability of
Success. Is there a likelihood that the intervention which I propose will advance
the well-being and good health of this patient? Fourth: Proportionality. Is the
intervention going to achieve equal or greater good than the harm that it will
cause? Fifth: Declaration. Have I declared my intentions and gotten appropriate
consults, while honoring the patient's right to privacy and safeguarding the
public? Is the patient, reasonably well informed? Do I have written consent, if at
all possible? Sixth: Last Resort. Is this treatment plan evolutionary? Does it
propose a course of action that is necessary while trying to care for the patient
with the least amount of harm inflicted? Seventh: Right Intention. Is my intention
to help the patient realize his or her potential for well-being? Are my intentions
precisely to achieve ajustgoal withjust means - no more and no less? Eighth: Just
Means. Are the means which I use morally good acts, omissions and treatments?
Are they appropriate for this patient without harming the caregiver or the
community?
Case Application

Mrs. Carter presented as an awake and alert, 93 year old, white, Methodist,
widow, reported to have been in good health, by her hursing home supervisor.
She was admitted to the Norwood Hospital Emergency Room from a local
nursing home, with a chief complaint of crushing chest pain. It was accompanied
by less severe ja wand left arm pain and shortness of breath. She was cyanotic,
cool and diaphoretic. She arrived by basic life support transport in a sitting
position and had a non-rebreather mask for oxygen supplementation.
When she arrived she was evaluated while having a 12 lead EKG, a portable
chest X-ray, a 22 gauge angiocath inserted (from which blood was obtained for
lab work) and a saline lock secured. Cardiac monitor leads were attached which
showed elevated T-waves. The diagnosis was made of an inferior myocardial
infarct, with congestive failure.
Mrs. Carter was a retired nurse. She grasped the severity of her condition and
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was very helpful in making decisions about her care with the healthcare team.

Just Cause
We sought to intervene because Mrs. Carter sought our aid to restore her to
health and well-being. She wanted, most of all to be relieved of her chest pain.
There was just cause for our intervention.

Legitimate Authority
In this case Mrs. Carter, a retired nurse, was conscious and alert and competent
to make decisions about her care. Dialogue with the patient regarding her goal for
and choices of treatment was continuous. The physician on duty was a Board
Certified Emergency Room Physician, with 15 years experience, working in an
accredited emergency room.

Last Resort
The medical intervention in the life of Catherine Carter developed as a part of
an evolutionary care plan. The first step was to ask the patient what was wrong.
Her chest pain and shortness of breath were treated first with supplementary
oxygen, then with intravenous Lasix, administered through a small bore IV
(accomplished with one stick) and from which blood was drawn for diagnostic
tests. Dialogue with Mrs. Carter was continuous. She made it clear that she did
not want to be intubated, have external cardiac masage (she was DNR on
admission to the hospital) or to be treated aggressively with cardiotonic drugs.
She wanted to be relieved of severe chest pain.

Declaration
Mrs. Carter understood the severity of her condition. She was offered
Morphine with an explanation of its benefits and burdens. She chose to have
Lasix, oxygen, and Morphine in addition to the diagnostic tests which were
performed.

Reasonable Hope for Success
As we stated above, the reasonable hope is to restore the reasonable health and
well-being of the patient in light of her telos and good medical practice. Mrs.
Carter did not want aggressive treatment, nor would it have been good medical
practice. The treatment she was given was consistent with what she wanted and
with what the health care team could reasonably provide.

Just Intention
Our intention was just because it was to restore the patient to a state of
reasonable health and well-being (to be free of unreasonable pain) through the
use of good and just means. The verification of this statement is treated under the
just means criterion.

Due Proportion
Here, the burden of the treatment (oxygen, EKG, cardiac monitor, portable
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Linacre Quarterly

chest X-ray, #22 angiocath, Lasix, Morphine 2 mgms. IV, and human
companionship) was in due or reasonable proportion to the pain control Mrs.
Carter realized.
Just Means

The means used were consistent with good medical practice and with the
wishes of the patient. They also verified our just intent, helping the patient to
realize good health, to the best of our ability, in the face of Nature. To review, the
means used were not too painful. The oxygen mask was adjusted for comfort and
when breathing became comfortable for her a nasal prong administration set was
used. The cardiac monitor leads and tracing were accomplished with no pain
inflicted. A small IV was placed with one venipuncture, diagnostic blood samples
were drawn from the same site, and medications were administered through the
line. The portable X-ray was somewhat disruptive but in keeping with the need to
make the diagnosis. Further, the means were not too inconvenient. Once the
patient was in the Emergency Room, the means were all readily available. The
cost of treatment for the patient, as well as for the thrid party payer, was low.
Some interventions for this disease are very expensive and when those treatments
are clinically indicated, the outcomes should be evaluated. 45 Finally, the means
were not too burdensome in light of Mrs. Carter's desire for treatment.
Did the means verify the just intent? There were questions raised about the use
of analgesic Morphine. The dose of 2mgms. IV, was appropriate for the age,
weight, and condition of the patient.46 A dose of this size would not have been
appropriate for a newborn, nor would it have verified the intent to relieve the
pain of a 30 year old patient who had been getting 800mgms., of Morphine IV
every hour for the prolonged pain control of bone cancer. It is an important
feature of this method of moral reasoning to verify the means used with the stated,
just intent.
Mrs. Carter received pain relief from her treatment which was verified by her
own admission and by her ability to engage in light conversation about her life as
a nurse and wife. She was both gracious and grateful for her care. She was
especially grateful that the health care team did not leave her unattended during
her brief stay in the emergency room. Mrs. Carter died peacefully, holding the
hand of her caregiver. Nature had taken its course.
We add this true and realistic conclusion, in order not to pretend that ethical
reasoning will provide an easy path to the practice of medicine. Rather, ethical
reasoning will provide the caregiver the assurance that he or she made a reasoned,
informed decision by using a comprehensive formulaic process of ethical
reasoning.
*1 wish to thank my advisor, Professor Arthur Dyck, for reading this manuscript,
making helpful suggestions, and for providing the challenge necessary to
complete this endeavor.
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